complexion of its House delegation while maintaining a low level of interparty competition within districts. In order to promote a Republican majority, the intercensal redistricting had to create populations of voters safe for one party or the other in as many districts as possible.

Current political conditions have both increased the incentives to gerrymander and exacerbated the democratic pathologies it leads to. Over the last 15 years, American politics on the national level has been subject to a striking paradox: it has become much more competitive at the macro level, when it comes to institutional control, but much less competitive at the micro level, when it comes to individual seats. Recent presidential elections have been very close and the Senate and House have been evenly or very nearly evenly divided. At the same time, the parties in the House have become much more homogeneous and ideologically polarized. Their homogeneity means that the majority party (with near unanimity on critical party matters) can dominate the House more effectively than before even with a small margin. Their polarization, on the other hand, means that the parties feel the stakes of control are higher. It increases both the costs of losing and the benefits of winning. In an almost evenly split House, where even a small gain in seats can make all the difference, parties will struggle hard however they can for each extra seat.

This struggle, of course, can have some positive effects. It may lead parties to field more attractive candidates, may engage party members more deeply in party activities, and may cause some voters to become more interested in politics. It has also had, however, some very bad effects. In particular, it has led parties to draw congressional districts to give their House candidates an

artificial competitive advantage. The strategies are as simple as the stakes are high. In states in which the redistricting power is divided, bipartisan gerrymanders are constructed to create ever safer districts while maintaining the partisan status quo. In states with unified party control, the party controlling the redistricting tries to pack as many of its opponent's voters into as few districts as possible, thereby giving its opponent victories in only a few districts but making every victory a landslide. At the same time, the controlling party tries to create comfortably safe, but less than "landslide" safe, districts for its own candidates everywhere else. That way it can send more of its candidates to the House of Representatives. Under either strategy, the overall result is a diminishing number of seats that are in any real or meaningful way competitive in general elections.

This practice undermines the unique role of the House in several ways. First, it weakens the responsiveness and accountability of each elected representative to voters in the district. As the Framers keenly understood, a representative who does not face the regular and effective discipline of the voters cannot be counted on to reflect their views. Second, it makes the House unrepresentative of the people overall. Making individual seats safe for one party means that the House fails to respond well to changes in underlying public sentiment as the Framers intended. Unless voters' attitudes change dramatically, control of the House will not change at all even though it and the country are nearly evenly divided. Even worse, voters' attitudes can change sharply – leading, say, to a national swing of five percent – and see little impact on House elections when only a tiny fraction of seats are within a five percent margin of change. Third, it can

effectively skew representation away from an overall constituency. If the only meaningful electoral challenge that can take place is in a party primary, a representative may be acutely responsive to the faction of ideological activists who regularly populate party primaries and largely unresponsive to the views of the average voter in the district. Centrist voters of both parties are thus artificially silenced and the House as a whole becomes even more polarized than before, which, in turn, encourages further partisan gerrymandering. The result is a vicious cycle leading to ever more frequent and more severe gerrymandering and worsening polarization in the House.

All this, of course, undermines the special role the Framers designed for the House of Representatives in our national government. Instead of ensuring that representatives have "an immediate dependence on, and an intimate sympathy with, the people," partisan gerrymandering frees them from that dependence. It allows them greater freedom to pursue others' interests and to "think, feel, reason, and act [*un*]like" the people they represent. The more electoral districts are designed to deaden real political competition, in other words, the less effectively elections operate to discipline the people's representatives and ensure that the House as a whole remains truly representative.

ARGUMENT

I. UNPRECEDENTED PARITY BETWEEN THE TWO MAJOR PARTIES ON THE NATIONAL LEVEL HAS CREATED GREAT PRESSURE TO MAKE INDIVIDUAL HOUSE DISTRICTS SAFE FOR ONE MAJOR POLITICAL PARTY OR THE OTHER.

A. The Near Equal Division of the House of Representatives, Its Widening Ideological Polarization, and the Increasing Homogeneity of Each of the Two Major Parties Mean That a Small Change in House Seats Matters Much More Than Before.

As the 2000 and 2004 elections showed, the two major parties enjoy nearly equal popular support across the nation as a whole. In 2000, for instance, while one presidential candidate won a plurality of votes, the other won a victory in the Electoral College; the Senate became split exactly in two; and the majority party's control of the House stood on an extremely slim margin (221-212). Gary C. Jacobson, *A House and Senate Divided: The Clinton Legacy and the Congressional Elections of 2000*, 116 Pol. Sci. Q. 5 (2001). In terms of popular support, the two major parties were more evenly matched than anytime since the nineteenth century. *Id.* at 6. And although the midterm elections of 2002 increased the size of the ruling party's margin in the House by six seats, that margin still stood near its modern low. The 2002 elections culminated a decade-long trend. As figure 1 shows, the *largest* margin of majority in the House since 1992 was less than one-third the historical average from 1960 until 1992, and the average margin for the last ten years is barely one-sixth of the average for the preceding period. *Infra* at App. A-1. By

any standard – historical or absolute – the margin of control in the House has been astonishingly narrow over the past ten years.

At first that might appear a good thing. After all, small margins of control might be thought to force the parties to cooperate, solve problems together, and allow some of their more centrist representatives a greater voice. But for two reasons exactly the opposite is true. First, the major parties in the House have become increasingly polarized. Gary C. Jacobson, The Politics of Congressional Elections 242-50 (5th ed. 2001). Poole-Rosenthal DW-Nominate Scores, a widely accepted measure of congressional ideology, show how markedly the parties have diverged over the last thirty years. *See* Keith T. Poole & Howard Rosenthal, Congress: A Political-Economic History of Roll Call Voting chs. 2-4 and App. A (1999) (explaining and justifying measure). These scores place each member of Congress on a liberal-conservative scale from -1.0 (liberal) to 1.0 (conservative) on the basis of nonunanimous roll call votes. As figure 2 shows, from the early 1970s on, the average scores for members of the Democratic and Republican parties have steadily and radically diverged. *Infra* at App. A-2. In fact, the score gap increased over fifty percent in that time and now amounts to over .86 points on just a 2-point scale.

Second, the major parties in the House have become much more homogeneous. There is now much less divergence than before *within* each party. As comparison of figures 3a-d shows, not only have both parties in the House shifted more towards the extremes, leading to less overlap in their policy positions, but each party has a much more cohesive focus than before. *Id.* at A-3 – A-6 (originally appearing at Jacobson, The Politics of Congressional

Elections, *supra*, at 246-47 figs. 8-4A-4D). In other words, the two major parties in the House have become increasingly discrete and insular. On policy, they are both more distant from each other and more internally homogeneous than before.

In such a world, small differences matter. The vanishingly narrow margins of control over the past ten years mean that a gain of just a few seats can completely switch party control of the House. From the 1970s through the early 1990s, for example, changes of up to 25 seats in any election would have made *no* difference to which party controlled the House. After 1992, however, a difference of as few as six seats and at most 15 would have made *all* the difference. The increasing homogeneity of each party over that same time, moreover, means that the party in control now has a greater focus and has to worry less about its individual members deviating from its preferred policy positions. The increasing polarization sharply raises the stakes of House control for each side. Since larger policy differences separate the parties, which one controls has a greater effect on legislative policy outcomes. In the 1970s, when less distance separated the two parties and they were less homogeneous, which one controlled the House mattered less because the policy outcomes sought and produced under one party would have been more similar to those sought and produced under the other. Once the parties' policy preferences markedly diverged and party members in the House voted more in lockstep than before, however, the policy stakes greatly increased. Because of their ideological polarization, each party wants more extreme policies than before and, because of homogenization, the party in control finds it much easier to achieve its preferred policies even with a small margin. Thus, the

stakes of redistricting have grown in two mutually reinforcing ways: narrow margins of control have meant that differences in just a few seats can change which party controls the House and a difference in party control makes a much larger difference in legislative policy outcomes. Shifting fewer seats produces larger legislative payoffs than before.

The parties understand this. In recent years, congressional redistricting battles in the states have become nastier and more pitched. The stakes are so high, in fact, that national party leaders from Washington have often led the battles. In the present case, for example, the Majority Leader of the United States House of Representatives pushed Texas state legislators to draw a new congressional map even though the existing plan was only one election old and the courts had approved it. *See Balderas v. Texas*, 536 U.S. 919 (2002) (affirming unpublished opinion of 3-judge court). His reason, stated publicly, was clear and simple: "I'm the majority leader, and we want more seats." David M. Halbfinger, *Across U.S., Redistricting as a Never-Ending Battle*, N.Y. Times A1 (July 1, 2003). The attempt produced such bitterness, however, that state representatives of the minority party repeatedly decamped the state in order to deprive one house or the other of the state legislature the two-thirds quorum necessary to pass a new plan. The senate representatives sojourned in New Mexico. *Texas Democrats Are Fined by G.O.P.*, N.Y. Times A9 (Aug. 15, 2003) ("Eleven Democrats have stayed at a hotel in Albuquerque since July 29, keeping the Texas Senate Republican majority from obtaining the quorum it needs to consider a Republican redistricting plan.").

In response, not only did the Texas Department of Public Security seek to arrest and return the minority party representatives to the statehouse but representatives of the United States House Majority Leader pressed several different instrumentalities of the federal government, including the Department of Justice and the Federal Aviation Administration, to help in the effort. Counsel to the United States House Majority Leader, for example, called the Department of Justice and asked if it had the legal authority to assist in forcing the return of the minority party state legislators to Texas. Office of the Inspector General, Department of Justice, An Investigation of the Department of Justice's Actions in Connection with the Search for Absent Texas Legislators 4-6 (Aug. 12, 2003) [hereinafter DOJ Investigation], *available at* http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/0308a/final.pdf. Late the day before a senior staffer for the United States Majority Leader called the Federal Aviation Administration's Administrator for Government & Industry Affairs asking for the current and past location of the plane of the former Speaker of the Texas House, which the staffer hoped might lead to the missing members. Statement of Hon. Kenneth M. Mead, Inspector General, U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration Efforts to Locate Aircraft N711RD (July 15, 2003) (testimony to House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure), *available at* http://www.oig.dot.gov/StreamFile?file=/data/pdfdocs/cc2003123.pdf. That same day the Texas Department of Public Safety contacted the federal Air and Marine Interdiction Coordination Center (AMICC), an arm of the United States Department of Homeland Security, asking it to locate an aircraft transporting Texas state legislators. Office of Inspector General, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Report of Investigation IN03-OIG-0662-S, at 1, *available*

at http://www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/DHS_OIG_Investigation_Texas.pdf. Employees at all three federal agencies spent time on these requests. The FAA and the AMICC gave state police officials or representatives of the United States House Majority Leader information on the location of the plane. The Department of Justice, after much internal consultation, did ultimately refuse to aid in the return of the errant Texas legislators. One Justice official aptly described the request from the Majority Leader's office as "wacko." DOJ Investigation, *supra*, at 5. So great is the pressure to gain seats that both federal and state political officials attempted to enlist the power of law enforcement and national security agencies for partisan ends. The House Committee of Standards of Official Conduct admonished the Majority Leader for his efforts in this case. Statement of the Committee Regarding Disposition of the Complaint Filed Against Representative Tom DeLay, House Comm. of Official Conduct, 108th Cong., 2nd Sess., *available at* http://www.house.gov/ethics/DeLay_Cover.htm (Oct. 6, 2004). This politicization of the rules of the game severely damages the legitimacy of our democratic process.

B. The Increasing Pressure to Gain Seats Has Led to Making House Districts Uncompetitive in a Way That Favors One Party.

To gain seats through redistricting requires a party in control of the redistricting process in individual states to follow only a simple strategy: that party must make its opponent's districts as few and its own as many as possible. To minimize the number of its opponent's districts, the party in control must pack as many of its opponent's voters as possible into each district the opponent controls. This

leads to the opposition party winning few districts but winning each by a landslide. To maximize the number of its own districts, by contrast, the controlling party must assign as few of its own voters to as many districts as it can while maintaining a reliable majority in each of them. This leads to the controlling party giving itself a comfortable but less sizeable margin in as many districts as possible. The strategy thus aims to make virtually every district uncompetitive and achieves its partisan ends by making the districts differentially uncompetitive for each party. By creating super-safe districts for the opposing party and merely safe districts for itself, the controlling party "wastes" minority party votes and efficiently deploys its own. Knowing that "one person, one vote" and race are virtually their only hard legal constraints, party strategists feel free to draw such lines.

An extreme example demonstrates these possibilities. Imagine a jurisdiction with 100 voters, four seats, and two parties, one of which claims 60 percent of the voters and the other 40 percent. If the voters are uniformly distributed across the jurisdiction, the majority party will necessarily win every seat so long as the districts are drawn contiguously. A uniform distribution of voters ensures that no matter how the jurisdiction draws its districts three majority party voters will accompany every two minority party votes. The only possible way to create a seat for the minority party would be to district noncontiguously on some basis where the voters were not uniformly distributed by party. If party affiliation varied roughly according to economic status, for example, non-geographic districts defined by ranges of wealth could permit the minority party to capture one seat. But, of course, such districts are only a theoretical possibility in our political system.

If the state legislature had complete freedom in assigning voters to districts and knew how individual voters voted, many results are possible. It could randomly assign voters to districts, for example, in which case each of the four districts would contain roughly 60 percent majority party voters and the majority party would win every district. At the other extreme, the legislature could split all the minority party voters evenly among three arbitrary districts. In such a scheme, the minority voters would have a bare majority in the first three districts while the majority party would have a 100% majority in the fourth.[2] Although the majority party would win by much more in the single district it controlled, it would lose three to one in the legislature itself. By differentially distributing party voters across districts, in other words, the legislature would be able to leverage a 40 percent party minority in the electorate into a 75 percent party majority in the legislature. At the extremes, the legislature could lock the minority party out completely, as in the random districts, or it could lock the majority party into a 25 percent minority position. If the parties were completely polarized and homogeneous, moreover, a 25 percent minority would be completely powerless in the legislature. The 75 percent majority would always get its way. At either extreme and in most places in between, for that matter, the legislature's ultimate policy

[2] A state legislature would usually, of course, be interested in boosting the representation of the majority party since the majority party would usually control it. If the present minority party had previously enjoyed control of the legislature and gerrymandered state legislative districts to favor its own candidates, however, it could still control the legislative process despite its minority status and then draw lines to give a majority of a state's congressional seats to minority party candidates. Gerrymandering on the state level can thus induce and compound democratic pathology at the level of the House.

outcomes would reflect less the underlying policy preferences of voters, which would not vary, than how voters were assigned to districts. In a real sense, the people's representatives would reflect the districts of the people rather than the people of the districts.

A party, of course, will usually want to reach no further than it can reliably grasp. Otherwise, a small shift in public opinion can cause its gerrymandering to backfire. *See* Bruce Cain, The Reapportionment Puzzle 151-59 (1984) (explaining how a party that cuts its margins too thin can lose many seats if voter support changes). To prevent this, a party in control of redistricting can be expected to give itself more than a thin margin of victory in its districts and may sacrifice a seat or two in order to ensure that it will continue to dominate its remaining districts if voter sentiment shifts somewhat in the later years of the reapportionment cycle. This insurance deadens competition in nearly every district. The party-victim of the gerrymander will enjoy wins in as few districts as possible but in each by a landslide while the party in control of the gerrymander will enjoy wins in a disproportionately large number of districts but by smaller margins. Few, if any, districts will remain in true competition.

Examples as extreme as those in the above hypotheticals are admittedly rare. In some states, redistricting power is divided between the parties, often producing bipartisan gerrymanders which maintain the partisan status quo while creating safer seats for both parties. Even with unified party control, legislatures do not have complete flexibility in assigning voters to districts. If only to avoid public backlash, they must pay some respect to geography and often as well to political subdivisions and communities of interests. Looking to these other concerns will temper what a state legislature

can do, if only a little. More importantly, until recently state legislatures could not so effectively gerrymander because in many instances they could not accurately predict voting behavior. Above all else, partisan gerrymandering depends on the ability to predict how different groupings of people will vote. If a legislature cannot tell whether drawing districts one way rather than another will help or hurt a particular party, it will not be tempted to gerrymander. As voting behavior becomes predictable, however, partisan gerrymandering becomes possible, powerful, and common.

Although technology has improved redistricters' ability to predict the partisan effects of various plans, the greatest improvement in prediction has come from changes in voting behavior itself. District-level voting behavior is more consistent now than it has been for many years. In the 2002 midterm congressional elections, in fact, fewer congressional districts had split preferences – voting for candidates of different parties for the House and presidency – than in any election in the previous 50 years. *See* Gary C. Jacobson, *Terror, Terrain, and Turnout: Explaining the 2002 Midterm Elections*, 118 Pol. Sci. Q. 1, 12 (2003). In only 62 House districts did voters not elect a representative from the same party for which they had voted for President two years before. *Id.* The 2004 results were even more marked. In only 59 House districts did voters not elect a representative from the same party for which they voted for President at the same time. *See* Gary Jacobson, *Polarized Politics*, *supra*, at 207 fig. 5. This increasing district-level consistency parallels a trend in individual voting behavior: the decline of split-ticket voting. From 1972 to 1996 the percentage of voters splitting tickets between presidential and senate candidates has dropped from 28 to 15 percent. Gary C. Jacobson, The Politics of Congressional Elections 149 fig. 6-2 (5th ed. 2001).

Such increased individual consistency allows those redistricting to predict much more accurately the partisan effects of their line-drawing. By understanding how individual precincts voted in the last presidential election, they can more reliably predict how those precincts will vote in future congressional elections and use this information to strategically aggregate precincts to provide majorities of the "right" size to each party.

II. ADVANTAGING ONE PARTY BY MAKING HOUSE DISTRICTS UNCOMPETITIVE UNDERMINES THE UNIQUE ROLE OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT.

A. By Deadening Competition in House Districts, Partisan Gerrymandering Dangerously Weakens the Responsiveness and Accountability of Representatives to Voters in Their Districts.

Partisan gerrymandering artificially advantages and disadvantages parties by deadening competition in as many districts as possible. Empirical research proves how much this harms the democratic process. As one leading political scientist describes its effects, the latest round of redistricting gave

> marginal incumbents of both parties . . . safer districts. Redistricting gave eight Democratic incumbents who had been representing Bush-majority districts[, districts in which Republican George W. Bush had won the popular vote in the 2000 presidential election,] new Gore-majority districts, [districts in which Democrat Al Gore had won the popular vote in that election]; only one suffered the contrary switch. . . . All thirteen

> of the switches involving Republican incumbents were from Gore- to Bush-majority districts. Of the twenty-five districts Republicans had won in 2000 with less than 55 percent of the major party vote, eighteen were strengthened by increasing the proportion of Bush voters; of the nineteen similarly marginal Democratic districts, fifteen were given a larger share of Gore voters. Thus, three quarters of the marginal districts were made safer by redistricting, half of them by more than [two] percentage points (in presidential vote share). If analysis is confined to districts with marginal incumbents who sought reelection in 2002, thirty-two of their forty districts (80 percent) were made safer by redistricting.

Gary C. Jacobson, *Terror, Terrain, and Turnout*, *supra*, at 10-11. In individual states, the effects could be even more extreme. Gerrymandering in California after the last census, for example, left not a single one of the state's 53 House districts competitive. *Id.* at 10.

Long term trends exacerbate this problem. As figure 4 shows, since at least the mid-twentieth century, competitiveness in House districts has markedly declined. *Infra* at App. A-7. In the decade of elections after the 1960s reapportionment, for example, an average of 73 seats were won with less than 55 percent of the major party vote. In the decade of elections after the 1990s reapportionment, by contrast, that figure fell by more than 10 percent to 65 seats.

More ominously, elections immediately following reapportionment have in recent years nearly always (the 1972 Nixon-McGovern election is the only exception) shown an increase in district competitiveness, but not in

2002. As one commentator has summed up the results appearing in table 1,

> elections held in the immediate aftermath of reapportionment . . . have generated particularly large freshman classes and have returned fewer incumbents than have other elections. On average, more incumbents retire from the House in post-reapportionment election cycles, more are defeated in primaries, more lose in the November general elections, and fewer win landside reelections. . . . [O]n average, since 1972, membership turnover has been about 45% larger in post-reapportionment Congresses, with 87 freshmen rather than 60. If anything, this tendency for greater turnover in post-redistricting election cycles had appeared to be increasing, as the 1992 elections had generated a freshman class with 110 members.

Hirsch, *supra*, at 183.

In the 2002 election, however, the opposite happened. Only 54 freshmen were elected – fewer than average for an ordinary election, far fewer than the average for post-reapportionment elections, and less than half the figure for 1992. This lack of competitiveness was, moreover, peculiar to House elections in 2002. While only approximately nine percent of House seats were decided by margins of ten percent or less, roughly half of U.S. Senate and gubernatorial elections held on that same day were that close. *Id.* at 183.

This fact bodes ill for the rest of the current reapportionment cycle. Since competitiveness typically declines over the course of each cycle, House elections will, if they follow history, become increasingly uncompetitive over the coming decade. In fact, since the 1960s, district competitiveness has on average declined nearly 25 percent from the beginning to the end of each reapportionment cycle. If that historical falloff rate continues – and intercensal districting, like that done by Texas, which aims to deaden competition in even more districts, can only make it worse – by the end of this redistricting cycle only 36 House seats will be competitive, i.e., won by fewer than 55 percent of the major party vote.[3]

---

[3] In the 1962, 1972, 1982, and 1992 elections, the first held in those reapportionment cycles, a total of 279 seats were won within this margin. In the 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000 elections, by contrast, the last held in these cycles, 212 seats were. *See infra* fig. 4 at App. A-7 (supplying figures for each year). The average beginning-to-end falloff rate in this period is thus 24 percent. Applying this figure to the 47 House seats decided within this margin in the 2002 election, predicts a decline to only 36 competitive seats in the 2010 elections.

Deadened competition has both individual and aggregate effects. On the individual level, it means that representatives fear less the regular judgment of the voters. The less competitive districts are, the less representatives will fear defeat at the polls and the less responsive they will be to general election voters. A representative who squeaks by will be very sensitive to what constituents want; a representative assured of a landslide less so. Uncompetitive districts, then, weaken the structures of accountability that the Framers believed made members of the House truly responsive to – and thus truly representative of – the people. They substitute responsiveness to party activists and donors for the rigorous discipline that the Framers intended frequent elections to place on members of the House.

On the aggregate level, deadened competition means that the House of Representatives as a whole will not well reflect changes in sentiment in the voters. Because so few districts can realistically change parties, the House as a whole will fail to track shifts in underlying popular opinion. A national swing of five percent in voter opinion – a sea change in most elections – will change very few seats in the current House of Representatives. Gerrymandering thus creates a kind of inertia arresting the House's dynamic process. It makes it less certain that votes in the chamber will reflect shifts in popular opinion and thus frustrates change and creates undemocratic slippage between the people and their government.

B. By Artificially Advantaging One Political Party over Another, Partisan Gerrymandering Can Be Expected to Skew Public Policy for the Duration of the Reapportionment Cycle.

Although partisan gerrymandering deadens competition within individual districts, that is its method, not its aim. Its aim, of course, is to give one of the major parties an advantage over the other in Congress. Comparing the major parties' shares of the 2000 presidential vote in the pre- and post-reapportionment House districts demonstrates how thoroughly current political gerrymandering has achieved this. As Gary Jacobson has explained, "The Bush-Gore vote division provides an excellent approximation of district partisanship. Short-term forces were evenly balanced in 2000, and party line voting was the highest in decades, hence both the national and district-level vote reflected the underlying partisan balance with unusual accuracy." Gary C. Jacobson, *Terror, Terrain, and Turnout*, *supra*, at 9. In other words, districts won by Democratic candidate Al Gore are generally Democratic while districts won by Republican candidate George W. Bush are generally Republican. As figure 5 shows starkly, the post-census redistrictings helped make many districts comfortably but leanly Republican and many other districts landslide Democratic. The last cycle of redistricting, in other words, made the parties seats differentially safe in a way that gave one side an artificial edge in the House.

In fact, all the districts in the country with party landslides of over 80 percent were won by a single party. In some states, of course, Democratic-controlled redistrictings artificially plumped the Democrats' share of the state congressional delegation; in others, Republican-controlled redistrictings artificially plumped the Republicans'. Both sides are guilty of such advantage-taking because the stakes are simply too high. In the 1980s, California Democrats were among the most notorious offenders. *See Badham v. Eu*, 694 F. Supp. 664 (N.D. Calif. 1988) (3-judge court), *aff'd*, 489 U.S. 1024 (1989). In 2003, the Texas Republicans were. On balance, however, as the figure above shows, the immediate post-2000 census plans advantaged the Republicans. The net effect was to increase the number of Republican districts by nine, from 228 to 237. Gary C. Jacobson, *Terror, Terrain, and Turnout*, *supra*, at 9. The 2003 Texas intercensal redistricting increased the number of Republican districts by a further six. *See* Jacobson, *Polarized Politics*, *supra*, at 201-02. Together they perhaps give one party control of the House for the remainder of the decade no matter what happens politically in the nation. This, of course, could substantively skew national public policy by giving control of the House to a party that otherwise would not have it.

Increasingly consistent and predictable voting behavior on the district level, moreover, means that there is little chance that partisan gerrymanders will become self-defeating. Although some have speculated that partisan gerrymandering is a self-limiting enterprise, *see* Cain, *supra*, at 151-59 (arguing that majority parties will be tempted to cut their margins too thin in order to gain as many seats as possible and will be thrown out of power by moderate shifts in voter opinion), evidence from the last

redistricting suggests less tradeoff between partisan gains and safe seats. Indeed, the more reliably voter behavior can be predicted, the smaller the margins of victory redistricters can employ without having to worry that their plans will later backfire. Furthermore, the newfound eagerness of some state legislatures, like Texas, to redistrict between censuses in order to give the majority party's congressional candidates further advantage – actions unprecedented since the reapportionment revolution began in the 1960s – shows that legislatures can recalibrate plans to ensure they never backfire. If a legislature finds that it cut the majority party's margins in safe districts too thin in its efforts to capture many seats, it can – if the same party still controls the legislature – simply fatten the margins a bit through periodic fine-tuning. Intercensal redistricting thus poses a special danger. It allows a legislature to lock in partisan gains by recalibrating majorities within districts throughout the decade. Such recalibration can negate the natural forces of population change and change of voter sentiment which can otherwise reinvigorate competition within districts and work towards making representatives more responsive to their constituents.

C. Partisan Gerrymandering Artificially Increases Ideological Polarization in the House.

By making individual districts uncompetitive, partisan gerrymandering frustrates the representation of centrist views in the House. Safe districts are drawn to be either more conservative or more liberal than a non-gerrymandered district would be; their average voter is intended to be reliably off the overall median. Artificially

skewing districts in this way is what ensures the election of candidates from particular parties. But that makes it less likely that candidates reflecting the views of these median voters will be elected anywhere. In advantaging one political party, then, partisan gerrymandering not only (1) disadvantages the other major political party and (2) makes districts uncompetitive, but also (3) makes more difficult the representation of views from the center.

Another feature of gerrymandering exacerbates this problem. Deadening competition between the major parties shifts any real political competition in the district into one party's primary, where ideological activists dominate. David Brady & Morris Fiorina, *Congress in the Era of the Permanent Campaign*, *in* The Permanent Campaign and Its Future 134, 135-36 (2000). Centrist candidates of both parties have trouble surviving in safe districts because in the primaries they must appeal to a group of voters representative neither of the district as a whole nor of even the party as a whole but only of the majority party's most intense members. More sharply ideological candidates appeal to this primary electorate. Democratic primary voters vote for more left-leaning candidates than the average Democrat, let alone the average voter, would and Republican primary voters vote for more right-leaning candidates than the average Republican or average voter would. As a result, districts elect candidates more extreme than the voters and the House has become bipolar even though the country has stayed largely in the middle. Making districts safe thus silences the vital center. Unlike the Framers' vision, a gerrymandered House reflects not popular sentiment in all its diversity but the sentiment of one extreme or the other in districts across the country. And that is not the worst. Just

as polarization within the House is one of the primary effects of partisan gerrymandering, it is also one of the primary causes. As discussed previously, polarization of a nearly evenly split House greatly raises the stakes of redistricting and so increases the incentives to gerrymander, which in turn leads to further polarization in the House. Far from limiting itself, under these conditions, partisan gerrymandering is self-intensifying. Polarization and partisan gerrymandering form a vicious circle where increases in one increase the likelihood of the other. Together with intercensal redistricting they ensure the defeat of the Framers' clear vision of the House.

CONCLUSION

Amici agree with Appellants' arguments on the law concerning the constitutionality of partisan gerrymandering and intercensal redistricting. For the reasons stated in Appellants' brief on the merits and for the reasons stated here, Amici strongly believe that this Court should develop workable standards to discipline egregious forms of partisan gerrymandering and foreclose intercensal redistricting motivated only by partisan advantage. Accordingly, Amici respectfully urge this Court to reverse the judgment of the district court and remand the case for further proceedings.

Respectfully submitted,

DANIEL R. ORTIZ
Counsel of Record
UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA
SCHOOL OF LAW
580 Massie Road
Charlottesville, VA 22903-1789

Table 1
Comparison of the 2002 Election
With Elections from 1972 to 2000

Category	*Average "Normal" Election (1974-1980, 1984-1990, 1994-2000)*	*Average Post-Reapportionment Election (1972, 1982, 1992)*	*2002 Election*
Incumbents reelected	375	348	381
By >20 points	297	261	338
By <20 points	78	87	43
Incumbents defeated	21	35	16
In the primary	3	13	8
In the general	18	22	8
Incumbent retirements	37	48	35
New members	60	87	54

Id. at 183 tbl. 1.

Hirsch, *supra*, at 197.

Figure 5
Distribution of Bush Districts and Gore Districts in the 2002 Plans






Figure 1: The Size of House Majorities, 1960-2004




Sources: 1960-2000: Calculated from data in Norman J. Ornstein, Thomas E. Mann, and Michael J. Malbin, *Vital Statistics on Congress 2001-2002* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 2002), Table 1-19; 2002: Office of the Clerk, House of Representatives, "Congressional Profile" at http://clerk.house.gov/members/congProfile.php. The 2004 figure calculated by Gary C. Jacobson.

Figure 2: Ideological Difference Between the House Parties, 87th Through 108th Congresses




Source: Computed by Gary Jacobson from DW-Nominate Scores calculated by Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal, available at http://voteview.com

Figure 3a: 93rd Congress (1973-74)




Source: See text.

Figure 3b: 97th Congress (1981-82)




Source: See text

Figure 3c: 101st Congress (1989-90)




Source: See text

Figure 3d: 105th Congress (1997-98)



Source: See text

Figure 4: House Seats Won With Less than 55% of the Major Party Vote, 1960-2002



Sources: Compiled by Gary Jacobson from data in *Congressional Quarterly's Guide to U.S. Elections*, 2nd. Ed. (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1985); Michael J. Dubin, *United States Congressional Elections, 1788-1997* (Jefferson, NC: MacFarland & Company, 1998); and U.S. Federal Election Commission, "Recent Election Results," at http://www.fec.gov/elections.html.

(12) (12) (13) (13)

FILED
FEB 1 -

Nos. 05-204, 05-254, 05-276 and 05-439

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN AMERICAN CITIZENS, *et al.*, *Appellants,*

v.

RICK PERRY, GOVERNOR OF TEXAS, *et al.*, *Appellees.*

TRAVIS COUNTY, TEXAS, *et al.*, *Appellants,*

v.

RICK PERRY, GOVERNOR OF TEXAS, *et al.*, *Appellees.*

EDDIE JACKSON, *et al.*, *Appellants,*

v.

RICK PERRY, GOVERNOR OF TEXAS, *et al.*, *Appellees.*

GI FORUM OF TEXAS, *et al.*, *Appellants,*

v.

RICK PERRY, GOVERNOR OF TEXAS, *et al.*, *Appellees.*

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas

BRIEF OF THE REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE AS *AMICUS CURIAE* SUPPORTING APPELLEES

THOMAS J. JOSEFIAK
Counsel of Record
SEAN CAIRNCROSS
REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE
310 First Street, S.E.
Washington, D.C. 20003
(202) 863-8500

February 1, 2006

Counsel for Amicus Curiae

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii

INTEREST OF THE AMICUS CURIAE 1

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 1

ARGUMENT 2

I. THE TEXAS 2003 LEGISLATIVELY ENACTED CONGRESSIONAL MAP DOES NOT VIOLATE THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT'S EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE 2

A. The Texas Map Does Not Meet the Standard Set Forth By the *Bandemer* Plurality 3

B. The Texas Map Survives Any Cognizable Standard of Vote Dilution 8

1. The *Vieth* Plaintiffs' Standard 13

2. The *Vieth* Dissenters' Standards 14

II. THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965 IS A STATUTORY SHIELD TO PROTECT MINORITY POPULATIONS, NOT A PARTISAN SWORD 16

CONCLUSION 22

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

CASES:

Badham v. Eu, 694 F. Supp. 664 (N.D. Cal. 1988) 5, 12

Baird v. Consol. City of Indianapolis, 976 F.2d 357 (7th Cir. 1992) 17-18

Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996) 4, 15

Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946) 8

**Davis v. Bandemer*, 478 U.S. 109 (1986) ..... *passim*

Hall v. Virginia, 276 F. Supp. 2d 528 (E.D. Va. 2003), *aff'd* 385 F.3d 421 (4th Cir. 2004) 17

Henderson v. Perry, 399 F. Supp. 2d 756 (E.D. Tex. 2005) 7, 8, 9, 11

Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997 (1994) 9-10, 18

Johnson-Lee v. City of Minneapolis, 2004 WL 2212044 (D.Minn.) (2004) 4

Lewis v. Alamance County, 99 F.3d 600 (4th Cir. 1996) ... 17

Nixon v. Kent County, 76 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996) 17

Pope v. Blue, 809 F. Supp. 392 (W.D.N.C. 1992) 5, 8

Quilter v. Voinovich, 981 F. Supp. 1032 (N.D.Ohio 1997), *aff'd*, 523 U.S. 1043 (1998) 17

Rodriguez v. Pataki, 308 F. Supp. 2d 346 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) 17

Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993) 14

Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986) 2, 16, 17

Table of Authorities (continued)

Page(s)

Uno v. Holyoke, 72 F.3d 973 (1st Cir. 1995) 17

**Vieth v. Jubelirer*, 541 U.S. 267 (2004) ..... *passim*

Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971) 9

STATUTES:

Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (§ 2) 16

LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS:

CLERK OF THE U.S. HOUSE, REPORT ON STATISTICS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL AND CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION OF NOVEMBER 2, 2004 (2005) *available at* http://clerk.house.gov/members/electionInfo/2004 election.pdf (last visited Jan. 27, 2006) 6

H.R. REP. NO. 97-227, at 30 (1981) 20

MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES RELATED TO THE RIGHT TO VOTE, 89th Cong. (1st Sess. 1965) 19

S. REP. No. 417, 97th Cong. (2d Sess. 1982), *reprinted in* 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177 ..... 20, 21

MISCELLANEOUS SOURCES:

MICHAEL BARONE, THE ALMANAC OF AMERICAN POLITICS 2004 (2003) 10, 16

Brief of Amicus Curiae Republican National Committee, *Davis v. Bandemer*, 478 U.S. 109 (1986) 3

Table of Authorities (continued)

Page(s)

Bureau of Commissions, Elections and Legislation, Pennsylvania Department of State, 2004 General Election Returns, *available at* http://web.dos.state.pa.us/cgi-bin/ElectionResults/elec_archive.cgi?which=Archive (last visited Jan. 26, 2006) 10

Michael A. Carvin and Louis K. Fisher, *A Legislative Task: Why Four Types Of Redistricting Challenges Are Not, or Should Not Be, Recognized by Courts*, 4 ELECTION L.J. 2, 12-27 (2005) 18

April Castro, *Texas Democrats Hopeful Despite Low Point*, THE ASSOCIATED PRESS, July 30, 2004 13

Chris Elliot, *A Message from TCDP Chair Chris Elliot*, Travis County Democratic Party Press Release, Nov. 2004 13

Galveston County Event Flyer, *available at* http://www.galvestoncountydemocraticparty.com/Special/TTB/index.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2006) ... 12

BYRON C. HULSEY, EVERETT DIRKSEN AND HIS PRESIDENTS: HOW A SENATE GIANT SHAPED AMERICAN POLITICS 210-11 (Univ. Press of Kansas 2000) 21, 22

NEIL MACNEIL, DIRKSEN: PORTRAIT OF A PUBLIC MAN 4 (The World Pub. Co. 1970) 21

Texas Democrats To Meet On The Island, THE [Galveston County, TX] DAILY NEWS, Dec. 28, 2005 12-13

Authorities principally relied upon are denoted by an asterisk ("").

INTEREST OF THE AMICUS CURIAE

Amicus Republican National Committee ("RNC") is an unincorporated association that represents the National Republican Party – including Republican congressmen and women, state legislators, and registered voters – and its interests are directly affected by the redistricting process in all fifty states, including Texas.[1] The RNC seeks fair redistricting procedures nationwide, such as those used by the Texas legislature in drawing the Texas 2003 legislatively enacted congressional map, Plan 1374C (the "Texas Map"), because such procedures protect against egregious partisan gerrymandering that dilutes opportunities for Republican congressional and state legislative candidates to win elections, and denies Republican voters their rights to full representation and to full participation in the political process.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

1. If a political party has geographically identifiable and stable demographic voting segments, sophisticated technology makes it possible to draw a congressional map that locks that party into winning a majority of the delegation despite losing the popular vote. Such a partisan gerrymander violates the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause. The Texas Map does not constitute such a political gerrymander, and it does not violate equal protection. This Court's political gerrymandering jurisprudence, beginning with *Davis v. Bandemer* and continuing through *Vieth v. Jubelirer*, makes clear that the Texas Map is not constitutionally deficient. The Texas Map survives scrutiny under the Court's plurality standard in *Bandemer*; indeed, the Texas Map survives scrutiny under any cognizable standard of vote dilution. On the contrary,

---

[1] The parties have consented to the filing of this brief. Their letters are on file with the Clerk of the Court. Pursuant to Rule 37.6, *amicus* states that no counsel for any party has authored this brief in whole or in part, and no person or entity other than *amicus* made a financial contribution to the preparation or submission of this brief.

the legislatively drawn Texas Map more accurately translates the Texas vote into Congressional representation.

2. Appellants' argument with respect to the Voting Rights Act amounts to interest group politics, which Justice White made clear in his *Thornburg v. Gingles* concurrence should play no part in the Act. The Voting Rights Act of 1965 was a legislative response to the violence that erupted in Selma, Alabama, when African-Americans simply tried to register to vote. The legislative record makes clear that legislators from *both* parties supported the Voting Rights Act's initial passage and each of its three following renewals as a means to tear down historical impediments to political participation that were (and are) targeted at or effecting minority populations – in particular, policies and programs designed to, or that did, stop African-Americans from voting. Based upon the Act's language, case law, the legislative record, and the historically clear and strong support of the Act by a majority of Republican congressmen and the Republican Party, it defies logic to argue that the Act was intended to favor one *political party* over another.

ARGUMENT

I. THE TEXAS 2003 LEGISLATIVELY ENACTED CONGRESSIONAL MAP DOES NOT VIOLATE THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT'S EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE.

Partisan gerrymandering removes control of legislative bodies from the hands of the electorate. By definition, partisan gerrymandering accords different weight to different votes on the basis of political party. A party with geographically identifiable and stable demographic voting segments can combine with clever cartographers to create a map that institutionalizes single-party domination over a state's congressional delegation against popular will. Such partisan

gerrymandering dilutes the votes of one (or more) party's voters in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The RNC has consistently articulated this concern and a plurality of this Court has recognized the potential for such a violation since *Davis v. Bandemer*.[2] 478 U.S. 109 (1986); *Vieth v. Jubelirer*, 541 U.S. 267, 292 (2004) ("the issue we have discussed is not whether severe partisan gerrymanders violate the Constitution, but whether it is for the courts to say when a violation has occurred, and to design a remedy"); *see also* Brief of Amicus Curiae Republican National Committee, *Bandemer*, 478 U.S. 109 (1986). The RNC's position on partisan gerrymandering remains unchanged.[3] While no single standard for determining an unconstitutional political gerrymander has emerged, it is clear that the Texas Map is not an unconstitutional political gerrymander under *any* standard.

A. The Texas Map Does Not Meet the Standard Set Forth By the *Bandemer* Plurality.

The Court first articulated a standard for establishing an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander in its plurality opinion in *Bandemer* – the only such standard that has ever been judicially

---

[2] Despite the Court's decision in *Vieth v. Jubelirer*, 541 U.S. 267, the justiciability of political gerrymander claims has not been foreclosed. 541 U.S. at 306-17 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

[3] Notably, the Democratic Party has failed to hold a consistent view; for example, in *Bandemer*, the Democratic Party filed an *amicus* brief that argued Indiana's map was unconstitutional – yet application in this case of the very standard argued for in that brief would likely have led to the Court's invalidating the Texas map that Appellants *favor* – the 2001 court drawn interim map. Moreover, it is notable that Democrats and/or their associated parties have not challenged maps in states such as California or Massachusetts – states in which the Democratic percentage of the congressional delegation far exceeds the Democrats' share of the popular vote.

endorsed.[4] The Court set this standard aside in *Vieth*; however, while *Bandemer's* test was never successful in identifying what does constitute an unconstitutional political gerrymander, it is instructive in this case insofar as it helped identify indicia of what does not.

Bandemer's standard was two-pronged: plaintiffs had to show intentional discrimination against, and actual discriminatory effects upon, an identifiable political group. *Bandemer,* 478 U.S. at 127. A threshold showing of discriminatory vote dilution was required to make out an initial equal protection case. Such vote dilution, in turn, triggered a violation only when the electoral system was arranged in a manner that "consistently degrades a voter's or a group of voters' influence on the process *as a whole*." *Id.* at 132 (emphasis added). Simply because a particular redistricting map made it more difficult for a particular group, including a political party, in a particular district to elect their representatives was not enough to show a discriminatory effect – winning elections was not the sole determinant of political

---

[4] Political gerrymandering equal protection claims have consistently been analyzed under rational relationship level of scrutiny, and the RNC does not argue here for the Court to apply a different level of scrutiny in this context. The Court has steadfastly refused to apply strict scrutiny to redistricting maps challenged on equal protection grounds on the basis of political gerrymandering. *See, e.g., Vieth*, 541 U.S. 267, 313-14 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("[t]he Fourteenth Amendment standard governs [political gerrymandering claims]; and there is no doubt of that"); *Bush v. Vera*, 517 U.S. 952, 964 (1996) (plurality opinion) ("[w]e have not subjected political gerrymandering to strict scrutiny"); *see also Johnson-Lee v. City of Minneapolis*, 2004 WL 2212044 (D.Minn.) (2004) ("[t]his Court interprets Justice Kennedy's choice of language [in *Vieth*]...as referring to the rational relation standard").

participation.[5] *Id.* at 131; *see also Badham v. Eu*, 694 F. Supp. 664, 669 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (effects test requires more than "present *or projected* election results under the challenged districts" (emphasis added)). Therefore, that fewer Democratic congressional candidates were elected in 2004 under the Texas Map would not be enough to invalidate the map.

The relevant discriminatory effects inquiry asked whether voters had been denied their ability to directly or indirectly influence the elections of a state legislature as a whole. *Bandemer*, 478 U.S. at 133. The Court set forth two broad categories in analyzing whether such a denial existed: (1) history of disproportionate election results visited on the plaintiffs; and (2) indicia of lack of political power or fair representation. *See id.* at 139; *Pope v. Blue*, 809 F. Supp. 392, 396 (W.D.N.C. 1992). Further, it is important to note that an equal protection claim based on partisan gerrymandering must ultimately be evaluated with respect to the makeup of the representative body that the map affects.[6] *See Bandemer*, 478 U.S. at 133. Since the Texas Map, however, is a *congressional*

---

[5] In addition, the *Bandemer* plurality held it would not be enough even to establish that the purportedly disadvantaged party had been "placed in a district with a supermajority of other [of that party's] voters" or that the district "departs from pre-existing political boundaries." *See Bandemer*, 478 U.S. at 140-41.

[6] *Bandemer* articulated a different inquiry for challenges directed at individual districts rather than those, such as in this case, which are directed at a statewide map. *See Bandemer*, 478 U.S. at 133. Since this case involves a congressional map, the relevant inquiry must be the Texas's voters' influence on the makeup of the United States House of Representatives as a whole. Appellants' challenge would therefore be properly supported by evidence of continued frustration of the will of a majority of the voters or effective denial to a minority of voters of a fair chance to influence the political process *nationwide*, rather than simply within the state of Texas. *Id.* at 133. Regardless of which point of reference is used, however, the threshold is not met in this case.

map, any accurate measure of "fairness" must view the Texas delegation in the context of the United States House of Representatives – and in 2004, Democrats won 46.6 percent of the national congressional vote and 46.4 percent of House seats. CLERK OF THE U.S. HOUSE, REPORT ON STATISTICS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL AND CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION OF NOVEMBER 2, 2004 (2005) *available at* http://clerk.house.gov/members/electionInfo/2004election.pdf (last visited Jan. 27, 2006). The Texas Map cannot be adjusted without altering this national balance. Appellants wholly fail to address this concern, or offer to any explanation as to why this demonstrates some "unfairness" on the part of the Texas Map.

Justice Powell, in his *Bandemer* concurrence, articulated an alternative standard for unconstitutionality that, although rejected by the Court in *Vieth*, the Texas Map also survives. Adhering to the intent and effect framework, Justice Powell wrote that the relevant inquiry's focus should be "whether district boundaries had been drawn solely for partisan ends to the exclusion of all other neutral factors relevant to the fairness of redistricting." *Bandemer*, 478 U.S. at 161 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Powell offered the following factors, among others, to consider: (1) the shapes of voting districts and adherence to established political subdivision boundaries; (2) the nature of the legislative procedures by which the apportionment law was adopted; (3) any legislative history reflecting contemporaneous legislative goals; and (4) evidence concerning population disparities and

statistics tending to show vote dilution.[7] *Id.* at 161. Appellants fail to offer support evidencing discriminatory effect in *any* of Justice Powell's suggested categories; if anything, the evidence demonstrates that the Texas Map redresses such discriminatory effects that had been visited upon *Republicans. See Henderson v. Perry*, 399 F. Supp. 2d 756 (E.D. Tex. 2005).[8]

Over time, lower courts attempting to apply *Bandemer* in political gerrymandering cases unanimously failed to find a constitutional violation. *See Vieth,* 541 U.S. at 279-80. Undoubtedly, some of this record is due to the difficulties inherent in applying *Bandemer's* test and in attempting to discern a concept as slippery as "political fairness." It is also due, however, to the high threshold the *Bandemer* plurality set

---

[7] This standard was rejected by the Court in *Vieth*: "Fairness is compatible with noncontiguous districts, it is compatible with districts that straddle political subdivisions, and it is compatible with a party not winning the number of seats that mirrors the proportion of its vote. Some criterion more solid and more demonstrably met than that seems to us necessary to enable the state legislatures to discern the limits of their districting discretion, to meaningfully constrain the discretion of the courts, and to win public acceptance for the courts' intrusion into a process that is the very foundation of democratic decision making." 541 U.S. at 292.

[8] The *Henderson* Court cited multiple sources in support of its view of past Texas redistricting maps as highly partisan gerrymanders. *See Henderson,* 399 F. Supp. 2d at 768 n. 47 (citing MICHAEL BARONE, THE ALMANAC OF AMERICAN POLITICS 2004, at 1510 (2003) ("The plan carefully constructs democratic districts with incredibly convoluted lines and packs heavily Republican suburban areas into just a few districts") and Brian P. Marron, *Doubting America's Sacred Duopoly: Disestablishment Theory and the Two-Party System*, 6 TEX. F. ON C.L. & C.R. 303, 307 (2002) ("Texas experienced what is sometimes referred to as 'the great partisan gerrymander of '91'... this 'packing' strategy helped the Democrats in the 1992 election to win 21 of the other 22 districts")).